Executive remuneration and corporate performance. Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange companies

The topic of this monograph refers to the remuneration of executives and its relationship with corporate performance. The thesis provides the review of the compensation and corporate governance theories with the focus on the principal-agent theory, which describes the conflict of interests between shareholders and executives. It delivers a broad review of corporate governance models, and its control mechanisms. Executive remuneration is a motivational mechanism that should solve the agency problem by aligning incentives of the managers and the shareholders. The monograph involves the review of the structures of remuneration across selected countries, including Poland. It shows different performance measures and their correlations with the executive remuneration in the international studies.

The main objective of this monograph is to examine the relationship of executive remuneration of the companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), particularly the chief executing officer (CEO) total compensation and corporate performance, measured by the changes in market valuation. The hypothesis of this paper is:

The total CEO compensation has a positive relationship with firm performance measured by the stock valuation for non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.